What did Wittgenstein say about word definitions vs usage?

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, primarily in his work Philosophical Investigations, fundamentally shifted the emphasis from definition to usage when considering the meaning of words.

He strongly argued against the traditional view—which he called the “Augustinian picture”—that every word has a fixed, corresponding object or mental idea that constitutes its meaning (a kind of static definition).

Instead, he proposed the famous maxim:

“For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning,’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” (Philosophical Investigations, §43)

Here are the key points of his contrast between definition and usage:

1. Meaning is Use

• Words as Tools: Wittgenstein compared words not to labels for objects, but to tools in a toolbox (hammer, pliers, saw, etc.). Just as the function of a hammer is defined by how it is used, the meaning of a word is defined by the ways it is used in practice in the shared activities of a linguistic community.
• Context Dependence: The meaning of a word is not an abstract essence, but emerges from the context of its application. For example, the word “Water!” can be a request, a warning, or an answer, depending on the situation. The single, static definition is insufficient; the multiple ways the word is used are what determine its meaning.

2. The Critique of Definition

• “Family Resemblances”: Wittgenstein challenged the idea that a single, essential definition could capture the meaning of many words. He famously used the example of the word “game.” When you try to define what is common to board games, card games, ball games, and Olympic games, you find no single feature shared by all. Instead, there are only “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing,” which he called family resemblances.
• Usage is Prior: For an external definition to be understood (even an ostensive definition like pointing and naming), you must already understand how the word is to be used. If someone points to a red object and says “red,” how do you know if they are naming its color, its shape, or the object itself? The prior understanding of the rules of use (the “language-game”) is what gives the definition its power.

In summary, for Wittgenstein, usage is the primary source and criterion of a word’s meaning. Trying to find a single, fixed definition is often a futile search for an essence that does not exist and leads to philosophical confusion, whereas observing the word’s actual function in a “language-game” reveals its true meaning.

For a deeper dive into the concept, check out Wittgenstein on Language and Reality: The Philosophy on Constructing Meaning.