The dotcom era was a wild ride. When the NASDAQ peaked on March 10, 2000, it was double its value of a year before. Historically, it takes seven years for a market to double in value on average. So to say the dotcom era was overheated is an understatement.
And it’s a misnomer to call it a boom. In a boom, someone’s actually making money. Amazon didn’t have a profitable quarter until Q4 of 2001, and it was a modest profit of $5 million. It didn’t have a profitable year until 2003. Google was more promising, as it was turning profits before its IPO.
But Google was the exception. A company didn’t have to be profitable for its stock to boom. Netscape was the poster child for this. It created a necessary product, but Marc Andreessen and Jim Clark couldn’t figure out how to make it profitable. Andreessen is only rich today because he and Clark managed to convince AOL to pay $10 billion for the company before they could finish running it into the ground. Transmeta was another example of a company with interesting technology but no profits. Competing with Intel wasn’t any easier during the dotcom bubble than it was in the years right before it.
The stereotypical dotcom business model went something like this: Find something nobody’s selling on the Internet. Register a domain name. Start selling that product on the Internet. Then wait for profits to happen like magic. And without a solid business plan that included things like logistics, those profits rarely happened and typically weren’t sustainable when they did. Just like in any other business. But since this was the Internet, it was going to be different this time, somehow.
When the dotcom bubble burst
Dave Farquhar